Abstract. Ring signatures and group signatures are prominent cryptographic primitives offering a combination of privacy and authentication. They enable individual users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of a group of users. In ring signatures, the group, i.e. the ring, is chosen in an ad hoc manner by the signer. In group signatures, group membership is controlled by a group manager. Group signatures additionally enforce accountability by providing the group manager with a secret tracing key that can be used to identify the otherwise anonymous signer when needed. Accountable ring signatures, introduced by Xu and Yung (CARDIS 2004), bridge the gap between the two notions. They provide maximal flexibility in choosing the ring, and at the same time maintain accountability by supporting a designated opener that can identify signers when needed. We revisit accountable ring signatures and offer a formal security model for the primitive. Our model offers strong security definitions incorporating protection against maliciously chosen keys and at the same time flexibility both in the choice of the ring and the opener. We give a generic construction using standard tools. We give a highly efficient instantiation of our generic construction in the random oracle model by meticulously combining Camenisch's group signature scheme (CRYPTO 1997) with a generalization of the one-out-of-many proofs of knowledge by Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015). Our instantiation yields signatures of logarithmic size (in the size of the ring) while relying solely on the well-studied decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In the process, we offer a number of optimizations for the recent Groth and Kohlweiss one-out-ofmany proofs, which may be useful for other applications. Accountable ring signatures imply traditional ring and group signatures. We therefore also obtain highly efficient instantiations of those primitives with signatures shorter than all existing ring signatures as well as existing group signatures relying on standard assumptions.
Introduction
Significant effort has been devoted to the study of signature schemes with privacy properties that allow a signer to remain anonymous within a set of users. Two prominent examples of anonymous signature schemes are ring signatures [RST01] and group signatures [CvH91] . Ring signatures allow a signer to choose any ad hoc set of users, i.e. a ring, and sign anonymously on behalf the ring. Group signatures also allow a signer to sign anonymously on behalf of a group of users but here group membership is controlled by a designated group manager. The advantage of group signatures is accountability; in case of abuse, the group manager can revoke anonymity and identify the signer.
Accountable ring signatures [XY04] bridge the gap between ring signatures and group signatures. They offer the flexibility of freely choosing the ring of users when creating a signature and at the same time enforce accountability by including an opener who can open a signature and reveal who signed it. The combination of flexibility and accountability allows applications where ring signatures or group signatures are less suitable. Consider, for instance, an online forum that wants to offer anonymity to users but also wants to be able to trace people who violate the code of conduct. A forum can achieve this by allowing user posts with accountable ring signatures where the owner is the specified opener. This system is decentralized and flexible since different fora can have their own opener keys and users do not have to register with each individual forum they post to. Another potential application is an auction system where bids are public but unsuccessful bidders want anonymity. Bidders sign bids with the seller as opener and at the end of the auctions the seller can disclose the winner in a verifiable way. OUR CONTRIBUTION. We introduce a new security model for accountable ring signatures. The signer specifies, in addition to a set of users that could have produced the signature, the public key of an opening entity, which will be able to remove anonymity. This opening mechanism offers protection against misbehaving signers while at the same time not relying on a single, centralized group manager. Our security definitions are stringent and when possible incorporate protection against maliciously chosen keys.
We provide a generic construction of accountable ring signatures from standard cryptographic tools. We also give a concrete instantiation, combining ideas from Camenisch's group signature [Cam97] with a generalization of the one-out-of-many proof of knowledge of Groth and Kohlweiss [GK15] . The most efficient ring and group signatures [ACJT00, CL02, CKS09, BBS04, DKNS04, CG05, Ngu05, GK15] in the literature are in the random oracle model [FS87] and so is ours. However, the only other assumption we make is the hardness of the well-established decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. 1 From a technical viewpoint, we offer two optimisations of Groth-Kohlweiss one-out-of-many proofs. One perspective on their proof system is that they form a binary tree and prove that one of the leaves is selected. We generalise their approach to n-ary trees, allowing us to fine-tune the parameters for better performance. For N = n m , our optimisations reduce the number of group elements in the 1-out-of-N proof from 4m to 2m with little impact on the number of field elements or computational cost. Also, while their proofs can be used for ElGamal encryption, which is what we need for our scheme, this imposes an overhead in all parts of their protocol. We deploy more efficient Pedersen commitments in some parts of the proof, thus limiting the overhead of ElGamal.
The end result is an accountable ring signature scheme with efficient computation and very small signatures. Namely, for a ring with N = poly(λ) users, we obtain signatures of size approximately 5 2 λ log 2 N bits, which is smaller than all existing group and ring signatures based on standard assumptions. RELATED WORK. Accountable ring signatures were informally defined by Xu and Yung [XY04] . Their security model mitigates the trust on the opener by using several openers and a threshold decryption mechanism, whereas we reduce the trust in the opener by allowing users to choose arbitrary openers (and leaving it to the verifier to decide whether they trust the opener). It would be easy to generalize our definitions to accommodate threshold decryption as well. Xu and Yung rely on the tamper-resistance of smart cards to ensure that the signatures contain some footprint of the signer. In our model, we require the signer to provide a proof that his signature is well-formed. Finally, Xu and Yung require the existence of trapdoor permutations whereas we rely on the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem.
Our security model for accountable ring signatures is also very similar to the identity escrow extension by Dodis et al. [DKNS04] , except that we allow for an arbitrary choice of opener and we require openers to prove correctness of their decisions. The construction in [DKNS04] relies on the strong RSA assumption whereas we rely on, in our opinion, the more established DDH assumption.
Traceable ring signatures [FS08] and linkable ring signatures [LWW04] also offer some restricted form of accountability. In traceable ring signatures, any couple of signatures produced by the same user will reveal her identity. In linkable group signatures, it is possible to efficiently decide whether two signatures were produced by the same user but without revealing his identity. Unique ring signatures [FZ13] encompass both traceable and linkable ring signatures.
Formal security models for group signatures were introduced by Bellare et al. [BMW03] [LLNW14] gave an efficient lattice-based group signature scheme supporting revocation, based on the hardness of approximating the shortest independent vectors problem in lattice of dimension n within a factorÕ(n 1.5 ). Our scheme achieves roughly the same signature sizes as theirs under an arguably more standard and better understood assumption.
Constant-size ring signatures can also be based on the strong RSA assumption [DKNS04] and on pairing assumptions [Ngu05] . Very recently, Groth and Kohlweiss provided a ring signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model, which is asymptotically more efficient than previous ones. Our accountable ring signature scheme extends Groth and Kohlweiss' scheme to enforce accountability and due to our optimisations, we get a performance improvement as well.
Defining Accountable Ring Signatures
We write y = A(x; r) when the algorithm A on input x and randomness r outputs y. We write y ← A(x) for the process of setting y = A(x; r) where r is sampled at random. We also write y ← S for sampling y uniformly at random from a set S. Given two functions f, g :
. We say f is negligible if f (λ) ≈ 0 and that f is overwhelming if f (λ) ≈ 1. By PPT we mean running in probabilistic polynomial time in the relevant security parameter λ.
An accountable ring signature scheme over a PPT setup Setup is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (OKGen, UKGen, Sign, Vfy, Open, Judge).
Setup(1 λ ): Given the security parameter, produces public parameters pp used (sometimes implicitly) by the rest of the scheme. The public parameters define key spaces PK, DK, VK, SK with efficient algorithms for sampling and deciding membership. OKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, produces a public key pk ∈ PK and secret key dk ∈ DK for an opener. Without loss of generality, we assume dk defines pk deterministically and write pk = OKGen(pp, dk) when computing pk from dk. UKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, produces a verification key vk ∈ VK and a secret signing key sk ∈ SK for a user. We can assume sk deterministically determines vk and write vk = UKGen(pp, sk) when computing vk from sk. Sign(pk, m, R, sk): Given an opener's public key, a message, a ring (i.e. a set of verification keys) and a secret key, produces a ring signature σ. The algorithm returns the error symbol ⊥ if the inputs are malformed, i.e., if pk / ∈ PK, R ⊂ VK, sk / ∈ SK or vk = UKGen(pp, sk) / ∈ R. Vfy(pk, m, R, σ): Given an opener's public key, a message, a ring and a signature, returns 1 if accepting the signature and 0 otherwise. We assume the algorithm always returns 0 if the inputs are malformed, i.e., if pk / ∈ PK or R ⊂ VK. Open(m, R, σ, dk): Given a message, a ring, a ring signature and an opener's secret key, returns a verification key vk and a proof ψ that the owner of vk produced the signature. If any of the inputs are invalid, i.e., dk / ∈ DK or σ is not a valid signature using pk = OKGen(pp, dk), the algorithm returns ⊥. Judge(pk, m, R, σ, vk, ψ): Given an opener's public key, a message, a ring, a signature, a verification key and a proof, returns 1 if accepting the proof and 0 otherwise. We assume the algorithm returns 0 if σ is invalid or vk / ∈ R.
An accountable ring signature scheme should be correct, fully unforgeable, anonymous and traceable as defined below.
Definition 1 (Perfect correctness). An accountable ring signature scheme is perfectly correct if for any PPT adversary A
We remark that correctness of the opening algorithm (w.r.t. an honestly generated opener key) is implied by the other requirements.
Full unforgeability ensures that an adversary, who may control the opener, can neither falsely accuse an honest user of producing a ring signature nor forge ring signatures on behalf of an honest ring. The former should hold even when all other users in the ring are corrupt. This requirement combines the non-frameability of group signatures [BSZ05] and the unforgeability of ring signatures [BKM09] requirements.
Definition 2 (Full Unforgeability). An accountable ring signature scheme is fully unforgeable if for any
-UKGen runs (vk, sk) ← UKGen(pp) and returns vk. Q UKGen is the set of verification keys vk that have been generated by this oracle. -Sign is an oracle that on query (pk, vk, m, R) returns σ ← Sign(pk, m, R, sk) if vk ∈ R ∩ Q UKGen .
Q Sign contains the queries and responses (pk, vk, m, R, σ). -Reveal is an oracle that when queried on vk ∈ Q UKGen returns the corresponding signing key sk.
Q Reveal is the list of verification keys vk for which the corresponding signing key has been revealed.
Anonymity ensures that a signature does not reveal the identity of the ring member who produced it without the opener explicitly wanting to open the particular signature. We allow the adversary to choose the secret signing keys of the users which implies anonymity against full key exposure attacks [BKM09] where the users' secret signing keys have been revealed. Our definition also captures unlinkability as used in [XY04]: if an adversary can link signatures by the same signer, it can break anonymity.
Definition 3 (Anonymity). An accountable ring signature scheme is anonymous if for any PPT adversary A
-Chal b is an oracle that the adversary can only call once. On query (m, R, sk 0 , sk 1 ) it runs σ 0 ← Sign(pk, m, R, sk 0 ); σ 1 ← Sign(pk, m, R, sk 1 ). If σ 0 = ⊥ and σ 1 = ⊥ it returns σ b , otherwise it returns ⊥. -Open is an oracle that on a query (m, R, σ) returns Open(m, R, σ, dk). If σ was obtained by calling
Chal b on (m, R), the oracle returns ⊥.
Traceability ensures that the specified opener can always identify the ring member who produced a signature and that she is able to produce a valid proof for her decision.
Definition 4 (Traceability). An accountable ring signature scheme is traceable if for any PPT adversary
Tracing soundness ensures that a signature cannot trace to two different users; only one person can be identified as the signer even when all users as well as the opener are fully corrupt. Similarly to the setting of group signatures [SSE + 12], this requirement is vital for some applications, e.g., where users might be rewarded for signatures they produced, or to avoid shifting blame when signatures are used as evidence of abuse.
Definition 5 (Tracing Soundness). An accountable ring signature scheme satisfies tracing soundness if for any PPT adversary A
Ring and Group Signatures from Accountable Ring Signatures
We will now relate accountable ring signatures to ring signatures and group signatures by showing that the latter are implied by accountable ring signatures. RING SIGNATURES. Traditional ring signatures [RST01] do not have an opener and their security requires anonymity of the signer and unforgeability [RST01, BKM09]. By simply regarding the opener's public key as part of the signature and ignoring the opening and judge algorithms, we obtain a traditional ring signature scheme from an accountable ring signature. Correctness and anonymity follow from those of the accountable ring signature, whereas unforgeability is implied by full unforgeability and traceability. GROUP SIGNATURES. Bellare et al. [BMW03] defined group signatures for static groups, where the population of the group is fixed once and for all at the setup time, and where the group manager additionally acts as the designated opener. Besides, correctness, their model requires full anonymity and full traceability. The latter requires that an adversary in possession of the group master secret key who can corrupt members of the group, cannot produce a new signature that does not trace to a user in set of corrupt users. An accountable ring signature satisfying our security definitions gives rise to a group signature scheme as follows: We fix the group manager as the designated opener and set the corresponding decryption key as the group master secret key gmsk used as the tracing key. In the setup, the group members generate their personal key pairs and we publish the ring containing the public keys of the members as part of the group signature public key. Group signatures are then just accountable ring signatures w.r.t. this ring. Full anonymity follows from the anonymity of the accountable ring signature scheme, whereas full traceability follows from full unforgeability and traceability. The group public key in our scheme is quite large since it grows linearly in the number of members. However, this is a cost that can be amortized over many signatures. An advantage of the group signature scheme on the other hand is that it can easily be made dynamic. The group manager can enrol or remove users by adding or deleting their verification keys from the group public key [DKNS04] . In the dynamic group signature scheme, the group public key is changing and group signatures must be verified against the group as it was at the time of signing, but for scenarios where the group is not changing too often or where great flexibility is desired this is a price worth paying.
Preliminaries
We define here the tools and assumptions we use.
Cyclic Groups and Assumptions
A group generator G is a PPT algorithm that on input 1 λ (for a security paremeter λ) returns a description gk = (G, q, g) of a group G of prime order q and a generator g. We assume the group has associated polynomial time algorithms for computing group operations and deciding membership.
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption holds relative to G if for all PPT adversaries A
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds relative to G if for all PPT adversaries A
The DDH assumption relative to G implies the DL assumption relative to G. The DDH assumption is believed to hold when G is an appropriately chosen subgroup of elliptic curve groups or multiplicative groups of large characteristic finite fields.
One-way Function
A function f : X → Y (over setup gk, which defines the function f , the domain X and range Y ) is one-way if f is polynomial-time computable and is hard to invert, i.e. for all PPT adversaries A
We will instantiate f via group exponentiation, i.e. x → g x with domain Z q and range G. The one-wayness of f is then implied by the DL assumption.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) Proofs
A NIZK proof system (over a setup gk) for an NP-relation R defining the language L R := {s | ∃w : (s, w) ∈ R}, where s is a statement and w is a witness, is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (CRSGen, Prove, PVfy) which are defined as follows:
CRSGen(gk) on input the setup gk, outputs a common reference string crs. Prove(crs, s, w) on input the reference string crs, a statement s and a witness w, outputs a proof π that (s, w) ∈ R. PVfy(crs, s, π) on input the reference string crs, a statement s and a proof π, verifies that π is a valid proof for s ∈ L R outputting a bit accordingly.
Perfect completeness of the proof system requires that for any crs generated by CRSGen and any pair (s, w) ∈ R we have Pr[PVfy(crs, s, Prove(crs, s, w))] = 1. Additionally, we require soundness and zero-knowledge, which are as follows:
-Soundness: For all PPT adversaries A, we have
-Zero-Knowledge: There exist PPT algorithms (SimCRSGen, SimProve), where SimCRSGen(gk) outputs a simulated reference string crs and possibly a simulation trapdoor τ , and SimProve(crs, s, τ ) produces a simulated proof (without knowing a witness). We require that
where on query (s, w) ∈ R, Sim returns π ← SimProve(crs, s, τ ).
Sigma-protocols. We will in our instantiation use NIZK proofs in the random oracle model obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS87] to interactive Σ-protocols, which are 3-move protocols that allow a prover to convince a verifier that a certain statement is true. A Σ-protocol for a relation R w.r.t. a setup gk is a tuple (G crs , P, V) which are defined as follows:
G crs (gk) on input the setup gk, outputs a common reference string crs. P(crs, s, w) on input the reference string crs, a statement s and a witness w, generates an initial message a. P(x) on input a random challenge x, computes a response z. V(crs, s, a, x, z) on input the reference string crs, a statement s, an initial message a, a random challenge x, and a response z, verifies the proof and outputs either 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
Besides completeness, we require Σ-protocols to have Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge (SHVZK) and n-Special Soundness [GK15]:
-SHVZK: Given any statement s ∈ L R and any verifier challenge x, it is possible to simulate a transcript of the protocol. -n-Special Soundness: For any statement s, from n accepting transcripts {(a,
for s ∈ L R where the challenges x i are distinct, we can extract w s.t. (s, w) ∈ R.
Signature of Knowledge
A Signature of Knowledge (SoK) for an NP-relation R w.r.t. a setup gk is a tuple (SoKSetup, SoKSign, SoKVerify) which are defined as follows:
SoKSetup(gk) on input the setup gk, outputs public parameters pp. SoKSign(pp, s, w, m) on input the public parameters pp, a statement s, a witness w, and a message m, outputs a signature σ SoK on m if (s, w) ∈ R. SoKVerify(pp, s, m, σ SoK ) on input the public parameters pp, a statement s, a message m, and a signature σ SoK , outputs 1 if σ SoK is a valid signature on m or 0 otherwise.
The (game-based) security definition for signatures of knowledge (SimExt) [CL06] , besides correctness, requires Simulatability and Extractability. We consider a stronger generalisation of the latter called
-Simulatability: There are PPT algorithms (SoKSimSetup, SoKSimSign), where SoKSimSetup(gk) outputs public parameters pp and some trapdoor τ , whereas SoKSimSign(pp, τ, s, m) outputs a signature σ SoK , such that
for all PPT adversaries A, where SoKSim(s, w, m) returns SoKSimSign(pp, τ, s, m) if (s, w) ∈ R and ⊥ otherwise.
-f -Extractability: For all PPT adversaries A, there exists a polynomial time algorithm SoKExtract such that:
In the above, Q SoKSim is a list of queries to the SoKSimSign oracle. Note that our extractability definition is stronger than that of [CL06] , as we allow the adversary to ask for signatures w.r.t. statements for which it does know the witness. In the definition, if f is the identity function, we get the standard notion of extractability.
Signatures of knowledge in the random oracle model can be efficiently realized by applying the FiatShamir transformation to Σ-protocols. Applying the transformation to Σ-protocols having quasi-unique responses (i.e. given an accepting transcript, it is infeasible to find a different accepting response w.r.t. the same initial message and challenge) provides weak simulation-extractability [FKMV12] , where the extractor needs to rewind the prover. To get straightline f -extractability, i.e. without rewinding [Fis05] , we additionally encrypt a function f of the witness with a public key in the reference string and prove that the encrypted value is consistent with the witness. This way we get both full weak extractability and straightline f -extractability simultaneously.
Commitment Scheme
A non-interactive commitment scheme (over a setup gk) consists of two polynomial-time algorithms (CGen, Com ck ), where CGen(gk) outputs a commitment key ck, and Com ck is a randomized algorithm that on input a message m and a randomness r outputs a commitment c. To open a commitment, one reveals m and r allowing anyone to verify that c is indeed a commitment to m. We require that the scheme is hiding and binding. Hiding requires that for all PPT stateful adversaries A
Binding requires that for all polynomial-time stateful adversaries A
Pedersen commitments [Ped91] are of the form c = g r h m where r ← Z * q , h ← G and m ∈ Z q . They are perfectly hiding and computationally binding assuming the DL assumption holds. We exploit the fact that the Pedersen commitment scheme is homomorphic, i.e., for all correctly generated gk, ck and all m, m , r, r ∈ Z q Com ck (m; r) · Com ck (m ; r ) = Com ck (m + m ; r + r ).
We will use a variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme to commit to multiple messages at once as shown in Fig. 1 .
IND-CPA Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (over setup gk) consists of three algorithms (PKEGen, Enc, Dec), which are defined as follows:
PKEGen(gk) is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the setup gk, generates a public key and decryption key pair (pk, dk). Without loss of generality, we assume pk can be efficiently computed given dk and write pk = PKEGen(gk, dk) for this computation which returns ⊥ if dk is not valid. Enc(pk, m) is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the public key pk and a message m, returns a ciphertext c if all its inputs are valid and ⊥ otherwise. Dec(dk, c) is a deterministic algorithm that on input the decryption key dk and a ciphertext c, returns either the message m or the failure symbol ⊥.
We assume that gk, which is an implicit input to Enc and Dec, defines the public key, decryption key, message, randomness and ciphertext spaces PK, DK, M, Rnd and C. Correctness of PKE requires that for all m ∈ M, all gk ← G(1 λ ) and all (pk, dk) ← PKEGen(gk), it holds that m = Dec(dk, Enc(pk, m)). We also require that the scheme is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), i.e., for all PPT stateful adversaries A
where we require A outputs m 0 , m 1 ∈ M.
We will in our instantiation use ElGamal encryption described in Fig. 2 , which is IND-CPA secure if the DDH assumption holds relative to G where gk = (G, q, g) ← G(1 λ ). We also note that ElGamal ciphertexts are homomorphic, similarly to Pedersen commitments. We have PK := G * , DK := Z * q , M := G, Rnd := Z q , and C := G 2 .
PKEGen(gk)
dk ← Z * q ; pk := g dk . Return (pk, dk).
Enc(pk, m)
If pk / ∈ G * or m / ∈ G return ⊥. r ← Z q ; Return c := (pk r , g r m). 
Constructing Accountable Ring Signatures
Our generic construction (shown in Fig. 3 ) uses a one-way function f , an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme, a signature of knowledge, and a zero-knowledge proof of membership, all of which share the same setup gk. The setup gk defines domain SK and range VK for f , and key, message, randomness and ciphertext spaces PK, DK, M, Rnd, C for the encryption scheme. The range of f and the message space of the encryption scheme need to be compatible such that VK ⊆ M.
The idea is that an opener will have a key pair for the encryption scheme and the user will have a secret key sk and corresponding verification key vk = f (sk). To sign a message m w.r.t. a ring R, the signer first encrypts her verification key under the opener's public key and provides a signature of knowledge on m proving the ciphertext encrypts a verification key in the ring and that she knows the secret key associated with the encrypted verification key. To open a signature, the opener decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the user's verification key and provides an NIZK proof of correct decryption.
The relations R sig and R open associated with the signature of knowledge and the NIZK system, respectively, are as follows:
Sign(pk, m, R, sk) vk ← f (sk); r ← Rnd; c ← Enc(pk, vk; r) σ SoK ← SoKSign(pp SoK , (pk, R, c), (sk, r) R sig := (pk, R, c), (sk, r) :
We prove the following theorem in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. The accountable ring signature construction in Fig. 3 is perfectly correct, anonymous, fully unforgeable, traceable, and satisfies tracing soundness if the building blocks satisfy the security definitions in Sec. 3.
Since all the building blocks can be constructed from (doubly enhanced) trapdoor permutations, we get as a corollary that trapdoor permutations imply the existence of accountable ring signatures.
Efficient Instantiation
We give here an efficient instantiation of the generic construction from Fig. 3 . The instantiation is secure in the random oracle model under the well-established DDH assumption. As specified in Sec. 3, we instantiate f with group exponentiation and the IND-CPA encryption scheme with ElGamal. We will get the Signature of Knowledge and NIZK proof for the relations R sig and R open by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to suitable Σ-protocols for these relations. Thanks to the straightline f -Extractability of our instantiation of the signature of knowledge, we can answer the adversary's Open queries in the anonymity game by extracting vk = f (sk) from σ SoK without rewinding.
Details of the Σ-protocols
We give here the details of the different Σ-protocols used in the instantiation. For all Σ-protocols, the setup includes the group description gk and the common reference string crs := (ck, ek), where ck ← CGen(gk), (ek, τ ) ← PKEGen(gk) and ek = g τ for τ ← Z * q , for the Pedersen commitment scheme and the ElGamal encryption scheme, respectively. The proofs of the lemmata can be found in Appendix B. Committed bits. We first give a Σ-protocol for a commitment B having an opening consisting of sequences of bits, where in each sequence there is exactly one 1. More precisely, we give in Fig. 4 a Σ-protocol (G crs , P 1 , V 1 ) for the relation The main idea is to prove that b j,i (1 − b j,i ) = 0 for all i, j, and also that n i=1 b j,i = 1.
; r C )
Accept if and only if
; z C ) Lemma 1. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 4 is perfectly complete, perfect SHVZK, computational 3-special sound and has quasi-unique responses.
List Containing Encryption of 1. We now describe a Σ-protocol that a list of N ElGamal ciphertexts (c 0 , . . . , c N −1 ) includes an encryption of 1. More precisely, we give a Σ-protocol (G crs , P 2 , V 2 ) (see Fig. 5 ) for the relation:
This generalizes easily to other homomorphic encryption and commitment schemes.
Since we can pad the list with copies of the last ciphertext (at little extra cost in the protocol), we may assume N = n m . We will later discuss the efficiency implications of different choices of n. The idea behind our Σ-protocol is to prove knowledge of an index for which the product
is an encryption of 1, where as usual δ ,i = 1 when i = and δ ,i = 0 otherwise. We have δ ,i = m−1 j=0 δ j ,i j , where = m−1 j=0 j n j and i = m−1 j=0 i j n j are the n-ary representations of and i respectively. The prover first commits to m sequences of n bits (δ j ,0 , . . . , δ j ,n−1 ). It runs the Σ-protocol in Fig. 4 to prove that the commitment is well-formed. On receiving a challenge x, the prover discloses elements f j,i = δ j ,i x + a j,i as in Fig. 4 . Observe that for every i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the product m−1 j=0 f j,i j is the evaluation at x of the polynomial p i (x) = m−1 j=0 (δ j ,i x + a j,i ). For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, we have:
for some coefficients p i,k depending on and a j,i . Note that p i,k can be computed by the prover independently of x, and that p (x) is the only degree m polynomial amongst p 0 (x), . . . , p N −1 (x).
From these coefficients and some random noise values ρ k , the prover computes ciphertexts
· Enc ek (1; ρ k ) and includes them in the initial message. These ciphertexts are then used to cancel out the low degree terms in (1). Namely, if c is an encryption of 1, the following product is an encryption of 1 for any x
Accept if and only if Correct Signature. We give in Fig. 6 a Σ-protocol for the relation R sig = ((pk, m, R, c), (sk, r)) : sk ∈ Z q ∧ vk = g sk ∈ R ⊂ G * ∧ c = Enc pk (vk; r) P sig (gk, crs, (pk, m, R, c), (r, sk)) V sig (gk, crs, (pk, m, R, c)) Lemma 3. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 6 is perfectly complete, SHVZK, m + 1-special sound and has quasiunique responses.
Lemma 4. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to the protocol in Fig. 6 with SoKSetup as in Sect. 5 produces a signature of knowledge in the random oracle model, that is extractable and straightline f -extractable.
Proof. For simulatability, SoKSimSetup is identical to SoKSetup and SoKSimSign programs the random oracle to simulate proofs. Simulatability then follows from SHVZK.
For extractability we rely on rewinding, m + 1 special soundness and quasi-unique responses, using [FKMV12] . For straightline f -extractability, we use the trapdoor τ to decrypt d in the proof transcript and obtain vk = f (sk).
Correct Opening. Writing out the details of ElGamal encryption we get
Lemma 5. The Σ-protocol in Fig. 7 is perfectly complete, perfect SHVZK, perfect 2-special sound and has unique responses. Also, applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to it produces a NIZK proof.
Efficiency of our schemes
The efficiency of our schemes is determined by the signature of knowledge of Fig. 6 . For a ring of N = n m users, this requires the prover to send m + 4 ElGamal ciphertexts, 4 Pedersen commitments and m(n − 1) + 6 elements of Z q . A full accountable ring signature includes an additional ElGamal encryption, i.e. 2m + 12 group elements and m(n − 1) + 6 field elements in total. A signature can be computed using mN + 3mn + 2m + 12 group exponentiations as follows. Computing A, C and D in the bit proof requires 2mn + 3 exponentiations since exponentiation by (1 − 2b i,j ) amounts to a multiplication. By construction of c i in Fig. 6 , the first components of all c i are identical in Fig. 5 , so computing the first components of all G k costs 2m exponentiations. The second components of all G k requires mN + m exponentiations. We also need 9 exponentiations to compute B in Fig. 5, d, A and B in Fig. 6 , and the ElGamal encryption of the public key.
Signatures can be verified using N + 2mn + 2m + 15 group exponentiations as follows: N + 2m + 3 exponentiations for the last verification equation in Fig. 5 , 2mn + 4 for the equations in Fig. 4 and 8 for the first two verification equations in Fig. 6 .
Our schemes can be instantiated over any group G where the DDH problem is computationally hard. Let us say the security parameter λ determines the bit size of the field elements as |q| ≈ λ bits and let N = poly(λ). When group elements are much larger than field elements, say more than a factor λ, it is convenient to choose a large n. For instance, setting n = λ + 1 (in which case m = O(1)) the communication complexity amounts to a constant number of group elements and mλ + 6 field elements. When group and field elements are of roughly the same size, as can be the case for elliptic curve groups, our signatures have total size m(n + 1) + 18 elements. Setting n = 4 gives communication of roughly 5 log 4 N + 18 = 5 2 log 2 N + 18 elements. In table 8, we compare our instantiation with prior work. Since our signatures require a logarithmic number of group elements, they enjoy shorter sizes than all previous signatures based on RSA and/or DDH assumptions, for sufficiently large security parameters. Indeed, a constant number of RSA ring elements typically requires O(λ 3 ) bits whereas the elliptic curve instantiation of our protocol achieves O(λ log N ) bit size. As long as λ is large enough and N ≤ 2 λ 2 , our signatures will be shorter. Our signatures are also a factor 2.8 shorter than Groth and Kohlweiss ring signatures. The adversary outputs a valid ring signature σ := (c, σ SoK ) on a message m w.r.t. a ring R and a proof ψ that the honest user with key vk produced the signature while such user never did so. We start by guessing the user the adversary is going to frame. We have a probability 1 η(λ) of guessing correctly, where η(λ) is a polynomial representing an upper bound on the number of honest users A uses in the game. By the soundness of the NIZK system, ψ is a proof for a valid statement (pk, c, vk) ∈ L Ropen . In the game, we abort if A asks for the secret key of the user we guessed. For all other honest users, we have chosen their key pairs ourselves and thus know their secret keys. Again, by the SimExt of the signature of knowledge, with overwhelming probability, we can extract a valid witness for the statement (pk, R, c) ∈ L R sig from σ SoK , from which we obtain (vk, sk) such that vk := f (sk) ∈ R. We use this to break the one-wayness of f which contradicts the security of the function f .
Lemma 8. The accountable ring signature scheme in Fig. 3 is traceable.
Proof. By the security of the signature of knowledge, we are able to extract a valid witness from σ SoK part of the valid signature σ = (c, σ SoK ) the adversary outputs. The witness thus satisfies vk = f (sk) where vk ∈ R ⊂ VK, pk ∈ PK and c = Enc(pk, vk; r) for some r ∈ Rnd and sk ∈ SK.
Since pk = PKEGen(gk; dk), we see from pk = ⊥ that dk ∈ DK. Correctness of the encryption algorithm implies that Dec(dk, c) = vk, which is the first part of the opening algorithm's output. Now the opening algorithm has a statement (pk, c, vk) and a corresponding witness dk. By the completeness of the NIZK proof system, ψ will verify correctly. This means that the Judge algorithm will output 1 which is a contradiction.
Lemma 9. The construction satisfies tracing soundness if SoK is SimExt secure, the NIZK proof system is sound and the encryption scheme is perfectly correct.
Proof. The SimExt security of the signature of knowledge ensures that from any signature σ SoK (w.r.t. a statment s) output by the adversary, we can extract a valid witness w such that (s, w) ∈ R sig which eliminates the case that the adversary forges a signature for a statement s * / ∈ L R sig . If this is not the case, we can use such an adversary to construct another adversary against the SimExt security of the signature of knowledge.
The soundness of the NIZK system for the relation R open ensures that ciphertext c contained in the ring signature decrypts to vk, which eliminates the case that the adversary can produce a proof ψ for a statement s * / ∈ L Ropen . Finally, the perfect correctness of the public-key encryption scheme (which is regarded as a perfectly-binding commitment scheme) ensures that a ciphertext has a unique decryption.
B Security proofs of our Σ-protocols

B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by inspection. The SHVZK simulator, given a challenge x, can simulate the transcript by picking f 0,1 , .
In both simulations and real proofs, f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 , z A , z C and C are independent, uniformly random and uniquely determine {f j,0 } m−1 j=0 , A, D, so the simulation is perfect. We also have quasi-unique responses, since two different valid answers f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 , z A , z C and f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 , z A , z C to one challenge would break the binding property of B x A and C x D.
We prove 3-special soundness in three parts. First, we show that any answers to 3 (actually 2) different challenges provide an opening of B. Second, we show that these answers imply that committed values are bits. Finally, we show that they imply that the sum of the committed values is 1. For the first part, suppose that a prover has answered two different challenges x and x correctly with answers (f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 , z A , z C ) and (f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 , z A , z C ). Since we have B x A = Com ck (f 0,0 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 ; z A ) and B x A = Com ck (f 0,0 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 ; z A ), from the first verification
x−x , gives us an opening of B. The first verification equation also gives an opening (a 0 , . . . , a 0 ; r A ) of A using a j,i = f j,i − xb j,i and r A = z A − xr. Note that by the binding properties of the commitment scheme, the prover cannot know a second opening of A or B, and must respond to any challenge with f j,i = b j,i x + a j,i . We can get openings of C and D to values c j,i , d j,i from the second equation in a similar way.
By the second verification equation, the values satisfy c j, 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First we prove perfect completeness. By the perfect completeness of the Σ-protocol in Fig. 4 we have that V 1 always accepts. Correctness of the last equation follows from the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption since
We now describe a special honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator. It chooses B ← G and G 1 , . . . , G m−1 ← G 2 . It runs the SHVZK simulator for P 1 to simulate A, C, D, z A , z C , f 0,1 , . . . , f m−1,n−1 and computes the f j,0 's accordingly. It picks z ← Z q and computes G 0 from the last verification equation.
By the DDH assumption, G 1 , . . . , G m−1 in a real proof are indistinguishable from picking random pairs in G 2 as in the simulation. We get independent, uniformly random B and z in both real proofs and simulations. By the perfect SHVZK of the simulator for P 1 we also have the same distribution of A, B, C, f j,i , z A , z C as in a real proof. Finally, G 0 is uniquely determined by the last verification equation in both real proofs and in simulations, so the two are indistinguishable. The last verification equation uniquely determines z, thus quasi-unique responses follow from the quasi-unique responses of the underlying Σ-protocol for R 1 . Now we prove the protocol is (m + 1)-special sound. Suppose an adversary can produce (m + 1) different accepting responses (f (0) j,i , z (0) ), . . . , (f (m) j,i , z (m) ) with respect to m + 1 different challenges x (0) , . . . , x (m) and the same initial message. Assume that m > 1. We use 3-special soundness of the Σ-protocol for R 1 to extract openings δ j ,i , a j,i for B and A with δ j ,i ∈ {0, 1} and n−1 i=0 δ j ,i = 1. The openings define := m−1 j=0 j n j , where j is the index of the only 1 in the sequence (δ j ,0 , . . . , δ j ,n−1 ). Following the proof, all answers satisfy f (e) j,i = δ j ,i x (e) + a j,i for 0 ≤ e ≤ m, with overwhelming probability due to the binding property of the commitment scheme. 1, x (e) , . . . , (x (e) ) m ). The x (e) values are distinct, so the matrix is invertible. We can thus obtain a linear combination θ 0 , . . . , θ n of the rows producing the vector (0, . . . , 0, 1). We deduce 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by direct verification and the perfect completeness of (P 2 , V 2 ). The SHVZK simulator chooses z a , z b , z s ← Z q and d ← G 2 at random and computes A, B from the verification equations. It runs the perfect SHVZK simulator for P 2 to get a 2 and z 2 . By the DDH assumption, d is indistinguishable from the ciphertexts in the real proof. In Both real proofs and simulations, z a , z b , z t are uniformly random and uniquely determine A, B giving us SHVZK. Since the verification equations uniquely determine z a , z b and z s and (P 2 , V 2 ) has quasi-unique responses, so must this protocol.
For (m + 1)-special soundness, consider accepting answers z a , z b , z s and z a , z b , z s to distinct challenges x and x . From the first verification equation we get c x−x = Enc pk (g zs−z s ; z a − z a ) giving sk = 
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by direct verification. The SHVZK simulator picks z ← Z q and computes A, B from the verification equations. Both in real proofs and simulated proofs z is uniformly random and the verification equations determine the initial message uniquely, so we have perfect simulation. As the first verification equation determines z we have unique responses.
For 2-special soundness, let z and z be accepting answers to distinct challenges x, x . The first verification equation gives pk x−x = g z−z , so dk = z−z x−x . The second gives u x−x = (v/vk) z−z , which shows u = (v/vk) dk . Thus, vk was encrypted in (u, v).
